In this paper we contrast the demographics, political preferences, and voting behavior of Latinos and Anglos. In doing so, we focus particularly on California because of the large quantity of economic, demographic, and political data concerning Latinos that are available for that state. Also, restricting ourselves to Latinos in California avoids the "problem" of cross-state diversity. We demonstrate that there is remarkable diversity among Latinos within California. Were we to add the Hispanic populations of other states to our analysis, particularly Cubans in Florida and Puerto Ricans in New York, we would magnify this diversity considerably. The purpose of our research is to provide suitable factual material for determining whether or not Latinos can constitute a "community of interest."
In this paper we examine demographic diversity, diversity of opinion on issues (expressed both as votes on ballot propositions and responses to survey questions), and diversity in choices of candidates. We also examine the willingness of non-Latino voters to vote for Latino candidates. We show that California's Latino population is very diverse-ethnically, socially, and economically. We also demonstrate that this ethnic, social, and economic diversity has a political parallel: the Latino electorate is not monolithic, and the policies Latinos support are not necessarily policies that non-Latino groups unite to oppose. This leads to the conclusion that the concept of "community of interest" is problematic with regard to Latinos in California-a conclusion that has implications for the application of California's voting rights precedents, as recently seen in Cano v. Davis.
I. DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN CALIFORNIA
While voting rights disputes in the United States are often associated with the South, where the world was literally looked at as "Black and White," California cannot be thought of in terms of "Black and White," "Latino and White," or "White and non-White." 3 In fact, California cannot even be thought of in terms of "Anglo, Hispanic, Asian, and Black" because there is too much diversity within each of these groups. For example, the term "Hispanic" can refer to people of completely different national origins, from different continents, and of different generations (e.g., both first-generation immigrants and second and later generations of Americans may be referred to as "Hispanic"). Similarly, in California the term "Asian" can refer to people of Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, or Cambodian origins, among others, with widely varying socioeconomic status. Thus, while 2 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal 2002); see infra Part VII. 3 There is a vast literature on voting rights in the context of black-white relations, Table 2 provides a detailed look at the national origin composition of the Hispanic population in California. Using the detailed information on Hispanic origin available from the 2000 Census, we give the number of residents in most major Hispanic national origin groups. Beginning with our profile of the California Hispanic population, we see that Mexicans constitute a large share (77%) of the total Hispanic population in California. Other national origin categories that have significant shares of the Hispanic population statewide are "other" Hispanics (14.2%), Salvadorans (2.5%), Guatemalans (1.3%), and Puerto Ricans (1.3%). Thus, before proceeding further, we note that the ethnic heterogeneity of Hispanics is substantial, especially for the population of a single state. We now turn to interracial marriage and persons claiming multracial identities. The 2000 U.S. Census questionnaires allowed respondents to indicate more than one identification with more than one race. 10 In California in 2000, the total number of persons of more than one race was 1,607,646, 11 and the figure for Los Angeles County was 469,781.
12
As we documented in Table 1 , in California 903,115 non-Hispanic persons indicated identification with more than one racial group, and 222,661 Los Angeles County non-Hispanic residents did the same. indicate that the number of interracial marriages nationwide has increased to just over three million. 13 Of the estimated three million interracial marriages reported in 2000, 50.8% of them involved marriages between someone who was White and someone who was Hispanic. 14 The Census Bureau reports that 1.7 million interracial households reported having children of their own under the age of eighteen. 15 A recent study by the Public Policy Institute of California shows that the multiracial/multiethnic birth rate had increased to over 14% of all births statewide in 1997. 16 This is greater than the proportion of births where both parents were Asian (just under 10%), and the proportion of births where both parents were Black (slightly more than 5%). 17 Last, the study found that the majority of all the multiracial/multiethnic births in 1997 were children with one Hispanic and one White parent (53%), while almost 75% of all the multiracial/multiethnic births in 1997 involved couples with one White non-Hispanic parent and another parent that was Hispanic, Asian or Black.
18 Thus, we have additional evidence that looking at the world in fixed categories of "Latino" and "non-Latino"-or "White," "Asian," "Latino," and "Black"-is inconsistent with reality.
Not only is there variation among Hispanics in ethnicity and national origin, but there is also variation on another demographic characteristic related to politics: income. Income is an important predictor of political preferences. And many political policy decisions have differential impacts on persons of different income levels. below the mean income of White families (over one-third of White families had incomes over $75,000; only 14% of Hispanic families had incomes over $75,000), there is diversity of income within the set of Hispanic families. As we indicate later, we believe that Hispanic families with incomes over $50,000 are likely to have more in common politically with Anglo families earning more than $50,000 than they do with Hispanic families earning less than $15,000. 
II. LATINOS HAVE DIVERSE POLITICAL VIEWS
In the previous section we showed that the population of California is racially and ethnically diverse. In this section we examine political diversity of the Latino community. It is convenient for observers of California politics to discuss Latino voters as if they constitute a monolithic voting bloc in California. But this view is inaccurate. Latinos are not a monolithic voting bloc, as has been widely recognized in the po-litical science literature for some time. 21 As we will show in this section, survey data collected from California Latinos provide additional strong support for our argument that Latinos are a diverse group. There is also substantial heterogeneity within the national Latino electorate regarding political preferences. 22 In other words, Latino voters do not agree about many of the important issues of the day; and, in light of such disagreement, it makes little sense to talk about Latino voters as an overwhelming bloc in contemporary elections. The academic literature on Hispanic political preferences and voting behavior at the national level also concludes that Hispanics are a diverse, rather than a monolithic community; and that diversity extends across national origin groups, immigration status, cultural roots, socioeconomic status, and political preferences and opinions. 23 We start by examining the level of Latino cohesion in California. Complicating the analysis of cohesion, though, is the lack of a precise definition of the concept of cohesion. To illustrate our use of the term cohesion, assume there are two groups, A and B, and one issue under debate on which people either agree or disagree. In this hypothetical example, group A would be totally cohesive if all members of group A either agreed or disagreed on the issue; thus, were a poll conducted about the issue, or if the issue were voted on by members of both groups, 100% of the members of group A would have to have the same opinion in order to be considered totally cohesive. The converse, a total lack of cohesion, is the situation where exactly 50% of members of group A agree with the issue and exactly 50% of the members of group A disagree with the issue. Of course, points between total cohesion and a total lack of cohesion represent varying 21 The authors studied an aggregated set of survey responses to identical questions asked in all ten surveys. The aggregated sample contained survey responses from 19,569 individuals, of whom 4444 were Latino, 1104 were Black, 1024 were Asian, and the remainder were White.
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The typical PPIC Statewide Survey interviews about 2000 California adult residents, and also seeks to sample roughly 400 Latinos, 100 Asians and 100 Blacks statewide.
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The conclusions of the Hajnal and Baldassare study are important and worth quoting: "California's racial and ethnic differences are complex, and in each of the arenas of politics and public policy that we study, we find racial and ethnic differences, and racial and ethnic similarities."
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They continue by arguing that apparent differences along racial and ethnic lines are almost always really driven by socioeconomic, immigrant, or citizenship status, or by partisan differences among the racial and economic groups. 28 We present in Table 4 Last, when asked about specific issue concerns-the overall issues that are seen as most important to each group-a strong consensus emerges: almost identical percentages of Latinos, Whites, Asians, and Blacks see education and schools, and then crime and gangs, as the two issues at the top of the policy agenda in California during this period. This level of consensus about the issue agenda is remarkable, and it again demonstrates that the basic political concerns of Californians are generally quite similar, no matter to which racial or ethnic group they belong.
o you think things in California are generally going in the right direction or the wrong direction?" Id. at 56 tbl.5.7. "The Most Important Policy Issue Question" also utilizes a standard format. Id. at 21 tbl.3.1. 30 Hajnal and Baldassare indicate that the tendency of Latinos to be slightly more conservative is true even after accounting for partisan differences and socioeconomic and demographic factors. Id. at 37-38. 31 Id. at 37-38 tbl.4.3. 32 Id. at 38 tbl.4.5. 33 Id. at 36. 34 Id. at 43 tbl.4.11. 35 Id. at 56 tbl.5.7. 36 Id. at 21 tbl.3.1.
In Table 5 we use Los Angeles Times exit poll data regarding Los Angeles County voters to examine the issue priorities that the four racial and ethnic groups used when deciding for whom to vote in the November 2000 presidential election. Each cell entry gives the percentage of persons in a group who listed the given issue as one of the two most important issues in determining their vote for president. First, it is clear from Table 5 that Los Angeles County voters of all racial and ethnic groups place varying levels of importance on each issue when deciding for whom to vote for president. White Los Angeles County voters in the 2000 general election had a variety of concerns: 36% saw education as one of the two most important issues in their decision making, 35% said moral and ethical values were important, 24% said the economy, and 20% said taxes. Black voters in Los Angeles County agreed with Whites that education was one of the two most important issues (54% said it was one of the two most important issues in their presidential vote), while 40% said the economy was important, 34% said social security, and 20% said moral and ethical values. Latino Los Angeles County voters largely agreed in the same relative ranking of issues as Blacks: 52% of Latino voters thought education was one of the two most important issues, 45% said the economy, 38% said social security, and 25% said moral and ethical values. Asian voters in Los Angeles County also saw education as one of the two most important issues, as 49% rated it as one of the two most important, with 46% saying the economy, 39% saying social security, and 24% indicating moral and ethical values as important in their presidential vote. Thus, the results in Table 5 document that each of the four racial and ethnic groups in Los Angeles County in the November 2000 presidential election had a diversity of political opinions; at least four issues were seen as important by at least 20% of the voters of each racial and ethnic group. Second, while Latino voters demonstrate a diversity of opinion about which issues are important, Latino voters in Los Angeles County agreed with Whites, Blacks, and Asians that education was the most important issue. Thus, voters from all racial and ethnic groups agreed that education was the most important issue in their presidential vote.
Is Latino political behavior heterogeneous as well? The answer is yes. We continue this analysis by examining data from the Los Angeles Times. In its exit poll of the 2000 elections, the Los Angeles Times asked all voters whether or not they supported two ballot measures: Propositions 38 (school vouchers) and 39 (school bonds). 38 We give the statewide vote for these two ballot measures by the voter's stated race or ethnicity in Table 6 . Proposition 38, which did not pass, failed due to opposition by all racial and ethnic groups in California's electorate. Latino voters opposed the school vouchers proposal (77%); but so did White voters (70%), Black voters (68%), and Asian voters (66%). 37 The data in Table 5 While there was some support in the Latino community for school vouchers, as shown by the 23% of Latinos who stated they supported this measure, the unified opposition of voters from across all racial and ethnic groups was an important part of the explanation for why this ballot measure failed to pass. 40 In the Knight-Ridder poll, Latino voters were asked about their opinions on abortion: do they favor laws that would make it easier for a woman to get an abortion, no change, or favor laws that would make it more difficult to get an abortion? Thirty-three percent of Latino voters favored laws making abortions easier, 14% supported no changes, and 44% favored laws that would make it more difficult for a woman to get an abortion. These same voters were asked their top priority for the use of the then-large federal budget surplus: 9% favored a tax cut, 11% wanted to pay off the national debt, 46% wanted to increase spending on social programs, and 31% wanted to make Social Security financially sound.
Illegal immigration and affirmative action were among the other important issues discussed in the Knight-Ridder survey. Latino voters were asked whether the United States government was doing enough, the right amount, or too much to stop immigrants from illegally entering the country. Forty-four percent said not enough, 30% said just the right amount, and 16% said too much. Regarding affirmative action, the question asked whether these programs designed to help women and minorities get better jobs and education should be reduced, continued, or expanded: 11% favored reduction, 39% favored continuation, and 46% favored expansion.
Education vouchers and health insurance were the last issues discussed in the Knight-Ridder survey. Regarding education vouchers, Latino voters were asked whether the government should spend money to assist families who want to send their children to private or religious schools, or if such government money should only be spent on children in public schools. Thirty-one percent favored government financial assistance for families to send their children to private and religious schools, while 59% supported spending government 40 The raw data for the Knight-Ridder survey was made available to the authors, and the statistics cited herein come from our analysis. See Steven Thomma, Courting the Hispanic Vote, MIAMI HERALD, July 23, 2000 (discussing the methodology and results of the Knight Ridder 2000 Latino Voter Survey and noting that both authors studied the data). money only on children in public schools. The health insurance question asked whether the federal government should or should not guarantee health insurance for every legal resident and citizen. Eighty-five percent of Latino voters favored guaranteed health insurance, and only 11% opposed government-guaranteed health insurance. To repeat our earlier point, examination of recent survey data from California Latinos shows a great deal of diversity in their political preferences rather than overwhelming cohesion.
We also examined whether or not Latinos were more likely than Anglos to say certain issues were important after controlling for respondents' gender, age, and level of education. Using the KnightRidder survey, we estimated a simple model to examine the probability that an individual would list each of eleven issues as one of the two most important issues. We controlled for the respondents' gender, age, and education, and estimated the impact of the respondents' ethnicity above and beyond those demographics characteristics on their probability of naming each issue. The results are reported in Table 7 . We found that on most issues, a respondent's being Latino rather than Anglo did not influence her probability of naming an issue. The exceptions to this were the issue of bilingual education, where being Latino made a respondent much more likely (.15) to name the issue as important, and bread-and-butter issues such as "Jobs and the Economy," which Latinos were also more likely than Anglos to name as important (.07). However, note that once we controlled for the respondents' age and education, Latinos are not more likely than Anglos to list improving education as an important issue. In all, the evidence suggests that Latinos are very similar to whites in their views about California policies. At this time, there is no reason to think that the increased participation by Latinos in the political process will result in significant shifts in citizens' policy preferences enacted through elections. Whites and Latinos hold the same views about the state policy issues that are considered important. They think alike with regard to how state funds should be spent. They generally agree on what needs to be done to improve the state's public school system.
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At the same time, Baldassare notes important differences between Latinos and Whites in California:
The differences between Latinos and whites are more subtle. Latinos are more enthusiastic about some reform proposals, such as school vouchers and state takeover of local schools. Latinos view state spending across all budget categories as more important. These trends probably 41 BALDASSARE, supra note 24, at 127.
Each table entry is the estimated impact of respondent's ethnicity on the probability of listing the entry listed on each row as one of the most important issues relative to the likelihood that Whites will list the issue as most important. Estimates come from a probit model controlling for respondent's age, education, and gender (impact computed with other variables set to their mean).
* indicates estimate significant at .10 level ** indicates estimate significant at .05 level reflect a more positive attitude among Latinos, and more cynicism among whites, about what the government can do for them. 42 Thus, while Baldassare focuses on the similarities between White and Latino political preferences, he does note that there are some significant distinctions.
Therefore
III. LATINO DIVERSITY ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Partisanship is another important political preference that demonstrates diversity in the Latino electorate. A common assumption is that Latino voters in California are uniformly Democratic in their identification; however, this assumption is false.
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The best demonstration of this important result is in Table 8 , where we use a variety of sources to examine partisanship. The table lists responses to a standard question asking voters with which party they identify. We show that in the 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996 general elections, Latino voter partisanship varied between 62% and 68% Democratic, and 15% to 21% Republican. In the two exit polls from the 1998 primary election, we found that Latino Democratic identification might have edged up slightly, to between 68% and 75%. 42 Id. These numbers imply that Latino voter partisanship in California does clearly lean towards the Democratic Party-but there is still a substantial segment of the Latino electorate that either is affiliated with the Republican Party or is not affiliated with either of the two major parties. Thus, in terms of partisanship, Latinos in California are not a monolithic voting bloc.
An important comparison in Table 8 is with the partisanship of Blacks in California. Notice that Black Democratic partisanship is almost always 80% or greater, and that Black partisanship is significantly more Democratic than Latino partisanship. This is significant because Blacks in California, and in the nation as a whole, are considered to be a solidly Democratic constituency. But compared to Blacks, it is clear that Latinos are not as strong in their affiliation with the Democratic Party in California, and thus are considered to be a target of opportunity for Republican recruitment efforts in a way that Blacks are not.
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Does the heterogeneity of the Latino electorate appear in their political behavior? The answer is "yes." We continue this analysis by examining data from the Los Angeles Times. In its exit poll conducted during the 2000 elections, the Los Angeles Times asked all voters which candidate they supported in the presidential and federal senatorial elections, as well as whether or not they supported two ballot measures-Propositions 38 (School Vouchers) and 39 (School Bonds). We provide the statewide votes in these two candidate races, by the voter's stated race or ethnicity, in In Table 9 By looking at the Latino demographics from WCVI data, we can see that the demographic distribution of voting within the Latino electorate looks very similar to the demographic distribution of voting within the Anglo electorate. 54 The WCVI exit poll found that 24% of California's Latino voters supported Bush, 2% supported another presidential candidate, and 74% supported Gore. We provide more detail of the 2000 presidential vote according to the WCVI exit poll in Table 10 . In Table 10 we first see that there is a significant gender gap in the Latino presidential vote in California; 58% of Gore's Latino voters were Latinas, while 52% of Bush's were Latino males. There is also a tendency for Latino voters at the higher ends of the income spectrum to vote for Bush: 31% of Bush's votes came from those making $70,000 or more, while 19% of Gore's votes came from Latino voters in that income range. Clearly, there are demographic differences in the profiles of Latinos who supported Gore and those who supported Bush. And an important thing to note is that these differences mirror the differences in the population at large, where it is well known that women favored Gore over Bush, 55 and that those with higher incomes were more likely to vote Republican. 56 
IV. LATINO ELECTORAL DIVERSITY
In Table 11 we tabulate, according to various exit polls, the rate at which Latino voters supported Democratic gubernatorial candidates across the last decade. Focusing first on the general election estimates, we see that Latino support for Democratic gubernatorial candidates in 1990, 1994, and 1998 was consistently estimated by the various exit polls to be 70% or 71%. The 1998 CNN exit poll did, however, produce a higher Latino vote (78%) for the Democratic candidate. In the 2002 election, though, the Latino Democratic gubernatorial vote fell considerably, to 65%. If we take this voting data into consideration, we again note that there is a substantial segment of the Latino electorate, roughly three out of every ten Latino voters in California, who are not voting for Democratic gubernatorial candidates in general elections. This last piece of evidence also flies in the face of any argument or assumption that Latino voters constitute a strong voting bloc in California. 
V. CALIFORNIA VOTERS: SUPPORT FOR LATINO CANDIDATES
Obviously, the ability of Latino candidates to win elections depends on the willingness of people to vote for them, and that willingness on the part of White, Asian, and Black voters is what we now consider. To be clear on terminology, we use the term crossover voting below to indicate a voter of one ethnic group voting for a candidate of another ethnic group rather than choosing a candidate from her own ethnic group. Thus, a White voter choosing a Latino candidate in a race between a Latino candidate and a White candidate would be an example of crossing over. While we also want to know the extent to which Asians and Blacks vote for Latinos, we would not call an Asian or Black voter choosing a Latino candidate in a Latino-White race a "crossover voter."
There are two different methodologies social scientists utilize to study voting behavior in general, and crossover voting in particular. 67 The preferred methodology for studying voting behavior and cross-over voting is for the researcher to use survey data.
68 Survey data, accumulated through face-to-face interviews with real voters leaving the polling places on election day (exit polls) or through telephone interviews with likely voters just before or just after an election, is regarded as the most accurate type of information available about individual political behavior.
69 After all, a survey involves interviews with individual voters themselves, so behavior, motivations, and personal demographic attributes can be measured for each individual voter in a survey study.
A less preferable social science methodology for studying voting behavior and crossover voting is for the researcher to use ecological data 70 -data that is generally collected at the precinct level-to make inferences from the aggregated precinct level data about the behavior of individuals. The problem with using ecological data to study voting behavior and crossover voting is that it requires strong assumptions. The problems with ecological analysis are well-known and welldocumented, and they arise because there is usually too little information about the individual to know with any degree of accuracy her true behavior. Achen and Shively summarized the problem:
We need to understand how individuals have been grouped into aggregates before we can interpret aggregate results. Statistically, the aggregation process introduces unknown parameters which can rarely be estimated and which are inextricably mixed with the parameters of interest. Untangling them requires assumptions whose validity can be supported only by reference to theory or data outside the problem at hand.
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These problems become even more difficult when there are multiple groups to study within each unit. To try to infer the behavior of Latinos or Anglos from aggregate information regarding units that contain not only Latinos and Anglos, but also Asians, Blacks, and other ethnic groups, is even more difficult. Thus, whenever possible, social scientists primarily use survey data when studying voting behavior and crossover voting; only in situations where survey data is not available do they resort to the more problematic ecological analysis. This is the methodological approach we adopt, and it is the same approach that we have used in our past research on crossover voting.
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The Los Angeles Times exit poll, interviewing actual voters as they leave polling places right after casting their ballots, has been con- We summarize the White voter crossover in each of these races, for a variety of geographical levels, in Table 12. 74 This table lists for a Latino candidate in the election. 75 The races listed in Table 12 are ordered by the extent of White voter crossover in the race and area. The highest level of White voter crossover occurred in Los Angeles County in the 1998 general election for Lieutenant Governor, where Bustamante received 55% of the votes cast by White voters. Bustamante also received high White crossover in the statewide sample, receiving 44% of White votes statewide as measured in the Los Angeles Times exit poll. The next two races, sorted by White crossover, involve Torres's run for Insurance Commissioner in 1994. We see that Torres received 41% White crossover in Los Angeles County in the 1994 general election and 42% White crossover statewide. The 2001 elections in Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Times exit poll data give us another perspective on the general voting behavior of Whites and Latinos regarding support for Latino and non-Latino candidates. For each candidate in the two citywide races involving Latino candidates, we can look-instead of at crossover voting as we did in Table 12 -at a more general measure of voters' propensities to support Latino or non-Latino candidates. This is done by examining the percentages of White, Asian, and Black voters who chose to vote for at least one of the Latino candidates on the ballot in the runoff elections in 2001, and comparing that to the percentages of Latino voters who were willing to vote for at least one non-Latino candidate in these same citywide elections. This analysis gives us a measure of the overall propensity of White, Asian, and Black voters to support Latino candidates, and of Latino voters to support non-Latino candidates.
We present this analysis in Table 14 presents data from the same Los Angeles Times exit polls, but with more detail for the various racial and ethnic groups, as well as a breakdown of the votes for Villaraigosa and Becerra in the April 2001 Los Angeles mayoral election. The data presented in the cells in Table 14 provide the percentage of each racial or ethnic group in the exit poll sample who reported voting for a particular Latino candidate, in the given geographic area, for the particular election. The Latino candidate vote shares by racial and ethnic groups are sorted by the percentage of Whites supporting each Latino candidate; thus, the data are in the same order as in Table 12 . 90 The data in this This analysis of the basic crossover voting estimates from the Los Angeles Times exit polls documents three basic conclusions about racial and ethnic crossover voting. First, Latino candidates can and do receive substantial numbers of White, Black, and Asian votes-in the San Fernando Valley, the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, and throughout the state. Second, the extent to which White voters support Latino candidates varies across candidates and races and is not a fixed measure depending simply upon ethnicity or race. Third, the data presented in Tables 12 and 14 document that both the nonWhite and the non-Latino voting coalitions are diverse and dynamic, shifting with the nature of the election, the geographic area, and the particular set of choices facing voters.
In fact, Table 15 , "low" income means less than $20,000 in yearly family income, "moderate" means between $20,000 and $75,000, and "high" means over $75,000. The portrait that emerges of White crossover voters in the three statewide races for which we have exit polling data indicates that moderate-to high-income White voters, with higher levels of educational attainment, who are moderates or liberals, are more willing to vote for Latino candidates. As the second-to-last row in Table 15 shows, this means that White crossover voters statewide are coming from the overwhelming majority of the White voter population: 92.6% of White voters in the state have either moderate or high levels of income, 84.6% of White voters in the state have a college education or better, and 63.6% of White voters are liberal or moderate in their political views.
When we turn to examine the profile of White crossover voters in the City of Los Angeles, we see a different picture. Generally, White crossover voters in Los Angeles, as compared to those statewide, tend to have slightly higher incomes, be better-educated, and be more ideologically diverse. White crossover voters reflect the later popula-tion of White voters in the City of Los Angeles, again demonstrating that a Latino candidate in the City of Los Angeles can be appealing to mainstream White voters. Thus, Latino candidates can gain significant numbers of White votes in the City of Los Angeles, just as they can statewide, by appealing to mainstream White voters.
VI. LATINO VOTERS AND THE 2003 RECALL ELECTION
The 2003 gubernatorial recall election constitutes an interesting case for our analysis. First, it is the most recent statewide election in California, so data from it provides a very recent portrait of racial and ethnic political behavior in the state. Second, the recall election also included a racially divisive ballot measure, Proposition 54 (the "Racial Privacy Initiative"), that-like the prior Proposition 209-was targeted at eliminating affirmative action policies by governmental agencies in California. 95 Third, the recall election involved a prominent Latino candidate, Cruz Bustamante (the sitting Lieutenant Governor); thus, we can examine the extent to which Latinos supported Bustamante (who, as a Latino, would be considered by many as a "candidate of choice") and the extent to which members of other racial and ethnic groups supported Bustamante's candidacy to be the first Latino governor of California in modern political history. 95 The official title and summary of Proposition 54 as contained in the voter in-We provide basic data on the recall election vote, by racial and ethnic groups, in Table 16 . The table gives information on the political behavior of each of the four racial and ethnic groups regarding: their estimated share of the recall election votes, their preferences on the recall question, their voting behavior on the three major replacement candidates, and their preferences for Proposition 54.
Thus, while a majority of Latino voters did support the Latino gubernatorial candidate in the race, a strong 44% of Latino voters did not support Bustamante, with 41% of Latino voters supporting one of two Anglo Republican candidates. In reference to previous statewide gubernatorial elections, this is the weakest support that Latino voters in California have given to a Democratic gubernatorial candidate, who in this case was a Latino.
Also worth noting is the number of votes for Bustamante by other racial and ethnic minority groups: 26% of Anglos, 67% of Blacks, and 34% of Asians supported Bustamante. Thus, the recall data again help document the willingness of Anglos, Blacks, and Asians to support Latino candidates in California.
Last, Table 16 provides data on the Proposition 54 vote (Proposition 54 was defeated in the election, with 63.9% of votes cast in opposition). Blacks strongly opposed Proposition 54, with 87% voting against the measure. Latinos and Asians also strongly opposed this ballot measure, with 75% of Latinos and 72% of Asians voting against it. Anglos also opposed the measure, though not as strongly as the other racial and ethnic groups, as 62% said they voted against this anti-affirmative action measure. These data document a convergence of opinion against Proposition 54 across racial and ethnic groups.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Our analysis has considered social, economic, and political data on Latinos in California. We have provided a great deal of data that documents two important conclusions about racial and ethnic politics in California, conclusions that have some legal implications.
First, Latinos in California are not a monolithic group. We have shown that Latinos are ethnically, socially, and economically diverse. We have also shown that Latinos in the state are divided in their opinions about important political matters, and that they are by no means unified in their partisanship, their ideology, or their support for a wide variety of political candidates-including Latino candidates. This does not mean that a single issue could not arise on which Latinos and non-Latinos would have opposing views. But the overwhelming evidence that we have presented here shows that such issues would be the exception, not the norm.
We documented this diversity across partisan affiliations, opinions on important political issues, voting behavior on important ballot measures, and voting for gubernatorial candidates in recent elections in California. We also demonstrated that in recently conducted na-
